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I. INTRODUCTION
Neither "tax simplification" nor its mirror image, complexity, is a
concept that can be easily defined or measured. I know of no com-
prehensive analytic framework for these ideas, nor are there any
empirical studies supplying a "simplicity index" of particular areas of
tax law and practice.I Journalists often ridicule the Internal Revenue
Code by pointing to lengthy involuted provisions and to definitions
that refer the reader to other definitions that in turn compel him to go
even farther afield. A favorite example is the 554-word sentence that
makes up Section 341(e)(1). But these statutory intricacies may in fact
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. BA., Cornell University, 1938; LL.B., 1941.
This article is a revised version of a paper submitted to the United States House of Representa-
tives. Panel Discussions on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 122-44 (February 5, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussions].
It is an honor, though a sad one, to contribute this article to an issue of the University of
Miami Law Review in memory of Jack Chommie. Our acquaintance began with a letter written
almost 21 years ago, when he had just begun his academic career at Dickinson School of Law,
and continued throughout his unusually productive professional life, my last letter from him
having arrived only a few weeks before his death. All who knew him in person, and the much
larger group that was familiar with his written work, were impressed by the combination of
technical competence, concern with broad issues, and personal idealism that his books and
articles reflected.
1. For general discussions of this area, see Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue
Code: The Problem of the Management of Tax Detail, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 673 (1969);
Woodworth, Tax Simplification and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
711; [hereinafter cited as Woodworth]; Roberts, A Report on Complexity and the Income Tax, 27
TAX L. REv. 325 (1972); Ginsburg, Tax Simplification-A Practitioner's View, 26 NAT'L TAX J.
317 (1973).
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be of minor importance, if they are addressed to tax experts concerned
with transactions that rarely occur; and they may even clarify the law,
despite their initially baffling phraseology. Sections 671-675, for exam-
ple, are intricate provisions. As compared with the pre-1946 law
governing income-splitting trusts, however, their message is crystal-
clear. The statutory language was simpler in earlier years, but the
taxpayer and his adviser had to weigh the implications of hundreds of
judicial decisions, most of which simply announced that all of the
relevant facts and circumstances were to be weighed in determining
whether the income of a trust was taxable to the grantor or to its
trustee and beneficiaries. The 1945 regulations and 1954 statutory
rules that replaced these judicial decisions were complex, but they
made it much easier to find one's way through the wilderness. On the
other hand, elaborate statutory verbiage can be a source of complexity
and an obstacle to simplification; I will offer some instances later in
this paper.
Simple language can also be a source of complexity. When the
taxpayer is advised by Section 163 that he can deduct "all interest paid
or accrued during the taxable year on indebtedness" and by Section
166 that he can deduct "any debt that becomes worthless within the
taxable year," the terms "interest" and "debt" are disarmingly simple.
But these words and others like them have been interpreted by
thousands of administrative rulings and judicial opinions, without
exhausting the possibilities. In some instances, it may be possible to
simplify the law by defining terms like these, either in the Code or by
Treasury Regulations; and occasionally the problem of ambiguity may
be side-stepped by depriving concepts like these of operative
significance. If scholarships were not exempt, for example, it would
not be necessary to decide whether money received by a student from a
university was a "scholarship" or a "salary." Often, however, there are
valid -reasons for using these slippery terms, and little prospect of
defining them with precision.
It is unfortunately the fact that, by its very nature, a tax on
income must take account of an almost infinite spectrum of business,
investment, and personal events and transactions. When such a tax is
imposed on tens of millions of taxpayers at rates yielding tens of
billions of dollars, only an incorrigible optimist could expect the kind
of simplicity that can be achieved with a poll tax, or that is charac-
teristic of local real property and sales taxes. Income taxation entails a
high level of irreducible complexity. In my opinion, the price is worth
paying; but there is in any event no likelihood that the income tax will
be repealed in the interest of achieving simplicity.
II. INHERENT STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITIES IN
EXISTING TAX LAW
Quite aside from the irreducible complexity of even the simplest
income tax, a host of additional complexities in existing law are the
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result of policy decisions that are not likely to be reversed in the
foreseeable future. I would like to mention these aspects of existing
law, without discussing them in detail, simply to describe the context
within which tax simplification must be considered. As economic and
political decisions, they may be good or bad-I will not pause to
debate them-but there can be no doubt about their contribution to
complexity. These structural features of existing law, which may be
modified in minor respects but seem in the main to be invulnerable to
major change, include the following:
A. The Concept of Realization
Taxpayers are not taxed on appreciation in the value of their
property, nor are they permitted to deduct a decline in value, until the
property is sold or otherwise disposed of. Although the statutory
requirement of a realization was given constitutional status by Eisner
v. Macomber,2 it is quite unlikely that the courts would impose this
requirement today. If taxpayers were required to value their assets
annually, and to take the current increase or decrease into account
currently, a number of complexities in existing law would evaporate.
Among them would be the elaborate rules regarding non-taxable
exchanges, the separate tax status of the corporation, and the distinc-
tion between business expenses and capital outlays. Conversely, pres-
ervation of the concept of realization necessarily requires statutory,
administrative and judicial rules to cover these areas, along with many
others. I do not mean to imply that there would be no offsetting social
costs in complying with an income tax law taking account of annual
changes in the taxpayer's net worth. The appraisal industry would
flourish, and its fees would no doubt be very considerable. I doubt,
however, that they would approach the cost of administering the
concept of realization as it operates in existing law. In any event, I see
no disposition in Congress to abolish the concept of realization in order
to achieve simplification of the tax law.
B. Cash Basis Accounting
A closely related structural feature of existing law is the privilege
of reporting income on a cash basis, which is open to almost all
individual taxpayers and to many corporations. This privilege creates
many opportunities to postpone the recognition of income, opening the
door to a variety of tax deferment schemes. Some are either'blocked
or, more frequently, inconvenienced by statutory or administrative
counter-measures. If all taxpayers were required to report-on an ac-
crual basis, these complexities could be greatly reduced.
However, cash basis accounting is more convenient for millions of
taxpayers whose only records consist of their bank statements and
cancelled checks, and it brings tax liability into closer contact with the
taxpayer's cash receipts than does accrual accounting. Here again, I
2. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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see little prospect of a major reform, despite the contribution it could
make to simpler rules of substantive tax law, especially since the cost
and inconvenience of requiring millions of taxpayers to use accrual
method would be an offsetting social burden.
C. The Corporation as a Separate Entity
Because the corporation is regarded as a separate taxable entity,
rather than as a partnership of its shareholders, the Code must contain
an elaborate set of rules to govern the distribution of dividends,
unreasonable accumulations, stock redemptions, corporate liquida-
tions, and other transactions between the corporation and its share-
holders. Many of these rules could be abolished, and others could be
simplified, if the corporation were treated as a partnership. 3 A less
drastic step, deserving more study than it has had so far, would be a
requirement that closely-held corporations, but not publicly owned
corporations, be compelled to elect Subchapter S treatment. Neither of
these possibilities has emerged from the stage of academic discussion,
however, with the result that the statutory rules based on the
corporation's separate entity will not lose their importance, or their
complexity, for the foreseeable future.
D. Progression in the Rate Structure
Although the effective rate of income taxation is not nearly as
progressive as the schedule of marginal tax rates suggests, there is
enough residual progression to stimulate income-splitting devices on a
large scale, as well as to encourage other avoidance techniques. The
exploitation of these opportunities, and the counter-measures adopted
by Congress, the Internal Revenue Service and the courts in an effort
to frustrate the most egregious of them, account for many complexities
in existing law. But progression is a deeply entrenched feature of our
income tax system, with its own rationale; and its preservation neces-
sarily requires the payment of a price in terms of legal and accounting
complexities. Speaking for myself, I would prefer more progression,
despite the additional complexities it would entail, rather than less.
E. Reduced Rate for Capital Gains
The fact that long-term capital gains are subject to a lower tax
rate than other types of income is perhaps the single most complicating
aspect of existing law. Preservation of the differential, even if it is
slightly narrowed by minor reforms, inevitably serves to perpetuate
complexities that are, of course, well known to the architects of tax laws
in Congress. Moreover, the differential rate for capital gains differs
from some of the other structural features of existing law that I have
mentioned (e.g., the concept of realization) in that its abolition would
not create a new source of compliance expense.
3. See discussion in Estate of Leonard E. Whitlock, 59 T.C. 490 (1972).
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F. Multi-Purpose Tax Provisions
In raising revenue, a tax necessarily pinches some people more
than others, and in doing so affects everyone's behavior. Strictly
speaking, therefore, no tax can be neutral. There are, however, vary-
ing degrees of non-neutrality; and as incentives, relief provisions and
penalties are added to the Internal Revenue Code, complexities in
interpreting and enforcing it are bound to multiply. For many if not
most provisions of this type, however, plausible economic and social
reasons can be advanced. Though every tax commentator asserts that
we are attempting to accomplish too many objectives and has his own
favorite list of unjustified incentive and relief provisions, few want to
repeal all such adjustments; and there is in any event little likelihood
that those who favor such draconic action could persuade Congress to
accept their recommendations.
III. POSSIBLE AREAS OF SIMPLIFICATION
Against this background, a dramatic reduction in complexities is
simply not in the cards. There are, however, some areas in which
marginal improvement is possible, and others that will be the breeding
grounds for new complexities unless we exercise great vigilance. I
would like now to turn to an examination of these areas.
A. Simplification of "Mass" Provisions
I would attach primary importance, so far as simplicity is con-
cerned, to "mass" provisions affecting millions of taxpayers, even if the
dollar amount per taxpayer is small and the complexities are mild
when compared with the trust and corporate areas. 4 As an example of
what I mean, let me refer to Form 2441, attached as Appendix A,
which is to be filed by every taxpayer claiming a deduction under
Section 214, the so-called dependency care provision. Because Section
214(c)(1) limits the deduction to $400 per month, Form 2441 requires
taxpayers to report their expenses on a monthly basis. This is annoying
enough, but since the statute refers to expenses that are "incurred"
during the month, taxpayers are put on an accrual basis in applying
the $400 limit, even though their income and other deductions are
computed on a cash basis. Without doubt, however, many taxpayers
think that the amount paid during the month is controlling. Some of
them short-change themselves, for example, by deducting only $400
for a month in which a domestic servant is paid $600 for two months'
work. Others inadvertently or deliberately violate the statute, for
4. When the standard deduction is increased in amount, the number of taxpayers who
itemize their personal deductions is reduced, and this simplifies the law for them, as pointed out
by Woodworth, supra note 1. But there is an offsetting cost. If a taxpayer with medical expenses,
casualty losses, bad debts, etc. should pay less than a taxpayer with an equal amount of adjusted
gross income who has not experienced these losses, an increase in the standard deduction
reduces or eliminates the differential. Administrative convenience and fairness are, unfortunately,
competing values.
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example, by deducting $400 a month for a servant who earns $4,800
for 10 months of work but is paid at the rate of $400 a month
throughout the year. The $400 a month limitation may serve a useful
purpose in theory, but I very much doubt that it justifies requiring
millions of taxpayers to shift from cash basis reporting to an accrual
method in computing their monthly expenditures. Most of these tax-
payers have no records other than their checkbooks and cancelled
checks, which disclose their cash payments but do not allocate the cost
of household services and dependent care to the particular months in
which the services were rendered.
This departure from cash accounting in computing monthly ex-
penditures under Section 214 is even more troublesome than it initially
appears because the taxpayer is then required by Section 214(a) to shift
back to cash accounting in ascertaining the aggregate amount that can
actually be deducted for the year. This means, in some cases, that
amounts paid in January for services rendered in December of the
previous year (or, conversely, paid in December for services to be
rendered in January) are not deductible in either year. In practice,
many taxpayers no doubt add up their actual expenditures during the
year for Section 214 items, divide by 12, and enter the resulting
amount for each month on Form 2441. Unless the Internal Revenue
Service demands an explanation from everyone who reports the same
amount of Section 214 expenditures for every month of the year (an
enforcement practice that would be both wasteful and abrasive), the
accounting niceties of Section 214 may well become a dead letter
except for the taxpayer who is unusually scrupulous, who is advised by
an expert, or whose return happens to be audited by a particularly
diligent revenue agent. 5 A paradox of this type of statutory refinement
is that its equity objective is often not attained because the intricate
rules cannot be uniformly enforced, so that the result in practice-as
distinguished from theory-is that some taxpayers get the relief in-
tended, others do not even if they are similarly situated, and everyone
pays the price of the extra complexity.
Another example of statutory requirements that overload both the
taxpayer's capacity to comply and the Internal Revenue Service's
capacity to enforce the law is the 1962 travel and entertainment rules.
Section 274 is replete with fine distinctions (graphically portrayed by
the "road map" in Appendix B) that might possibly be given meaning
if applied to a limited number of very important transactions, but that,
in my opinion, cannot possibly be enforced with an acceptable degree
of uniformity in the area for which they are prescribed. I refer, for
example, to the difference between entertainment that is "directly
related" to the active conduct of the taxpayer's business and enter-
5. For the Internal Revenue Service's own difficulties with section 214, resulting in errors on
Form 2441 as prescribed for the calendar year 1972, see Panel Discussions, supra note 1, in the
footnote denoted by (*), at 125-26.
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tainment that is only "associated" with the active conduct of the
business, as well as to such phrases as "substantial and bona fide
business discussion," "primarily for the furtherance" of business, and
"circumstances . . . generally considered to be conducive to a business
discussion." By themselves, any of these phrases might be enforceable,
but the problem is that they are all imposed in addition to the general
requirement of Section 162 that the expense be "paid or incurred . . .
in carrying on [the taxpayer's] trade or business," and there is no
objective measure of what they add to this threshold requirement.
Except for the substantiation rules and the debatable dollar limit on
business gifts, the elaborate verbiage does almost nothing that could
not have been achieved by a simple presumption or a single hortatory
adjective .
6
A systematic study of the sources of misunderstanding and error
in "mass" tax provisions would be illuminating. Such a study could
well begin with a tabulation of the questions put by taxpayers to the
taxpayer assistance offices of the Internal Revenue Service; and it
would be equally useful to know whether some questions cannot be
readily answered by agents assigned to this function because they
themselves find it difficult to interpret the statutory provisions. Such a
study ought to include an examination of a random sample of low
income returns to identify recurring errors attributable to statutory
intricacies. (For example, how often do taxpayers misapply the rules
governing deductibility of medical insurance premiums?) The aim of
the study should not be to ascertain whether taxes are overpaid or
underpaid as a result of interpretive errors. It should be, rather, an
evaluation of the interpretative problem itself, leading to a judgment
on whether the statutory draftsman's ingenuity has outstripped the
capacity of taxpayers to comply with the law and the Service's capac-
ity to enforce it.7 Above all, the study should be conducted in collab-
oration with independent outside experts and on completion should be
made available for public analysis.
B. "Token" Reform Measures
A second major problem in the area of tax simplification is the
growing tendency to complicate the Code with token reform measures
6. See the recent comment by Judge Hall in George Durgom, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM.
DEC. 74,058, at 74-265 n.3 (March 7, 1974) (mem.):
While it is this Court's role to construe and apply the Code and regulations and not
to intrude its own notions as to tax policy, the extremely laborious task cut out for us by
the application to the facts of this case of an almost unbearably prolix and convoluted
set of regulations [under section 274] makes it difficult to resist the observation that the
average citizen to whom these regulations are applicable could not realistically be
expected to comprehend and follow them in every precise detail, if they are construed in
the most rigorous possible sense. The Court has accordingly attempted to give the
regulations as common-sense a construction as the rather astounding wording permits.
7. A "Readability Analysis" of the Instructions to Form 1040 (conducted by Dr. Roy J. Butz,
Reading and Language Center, Pontiac, Mich.) reached the conclusion that a taxpayer would
have to read at the college graduate level to understand these instructions. See also the Crossley
Survey, commissioned by the Internal Revenue Service, 118 CONG. REC. 13195-204 (1972).
19741
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
that pacify complainants rather than solve problems. An illustration is
the minimum tax for tax preferences, enacted in 1969.8 This intricate
provision imposes an actual tax liability on only a comparative handful
of taxpayers (19,000 individuals in 1970), but it compels many more to
work through its calculations to determine if it applies to them. In
1970, 76,000 taxpayers filed Form 4625, required of every taxpayer
with more than $15,000 of tax preference items, even if no minimum
tax is due. It would be instructive to know how many more should
have been filed.
If the minimum tax remains in force, we can anticipate an endless
series of proposals to amend it. Some will wish to tighten it by
enlarging the list of preferences, lowering the exempt floor and raising
the rate. Others will propose to eliminate "inequities" by permitting
tax preferences and taxable income to be averaged over a period of
years, by stepping up the basis of property to reflect the minimum tax
paid on accelerated depreciation, amortization, stock options, etc., and
introducing other refinements. More important, the mere existence of
the minimum tax will provide a permanent mechanism for avoiding
fundamental reform, just as the mere existence of the special rate on
long-term capital gains has invited the proliferation of provisions to
give similar benefits to a host of other items.
According to former Undersecretary of the Treasury Cohen, more
than 80% of the preference income reported by the 19,000 individuals
subject to the minimum tax in 1970 was the excluded half of long-term
capital gains; percentage depletion was evidently the second most
important item when individuals and corporations are combined. 9 In
my opinion, a comparatively small change in the capital gain area
-reducing the excluded portion, for example, or lowering the amount
subject to the 25% rate ceiling-would accomplish more by itself, and
would set a better precedent, than tinkering with the minimum tax.
Another illustration of tokenism is the "excess farm deduction
account" established by section 1251, enacted in 1969. Section 1251
requires a taxpayer who deducts farm losses from non-farm income to
establish an "excess deductions account" if his adjusted gross from
non-farm sources exceeds $50,000 and his net loss from farming ex-
ceeds $25,000. The account is carried forward from year to year,
reduced by any profits he may make from his farming activity. If there
is a balance in the section 1251 account when the farm is sold, any
profit on the sale must be reported pro tanto as ordinary income,
rather than as long-term capital gain.
Section 1251, to be blunt, is either much ado about nothing, or
8. See Note, The Minimum Tax for Items of Tax Preference . . . Movement Toward a
Comprehensive Tax Base?, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 365 (1972); Schenk, Minimum Tax for Tax
Preferences, 48 TAXES 201 (1970).
9. Remarks of Edwin Cohen to Tax Forum, United States Chamber of Commerce, Nov. 29,
1973 (Transcript at 13).
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much ado about nearly nothing. If the taxpayer ultimately sells his
farm at a loss, there will be no capital gain to be transmuted by section
1251 into ordinary income. If he passes the farm on to his heirs at
death, it will get a new basis under section 1014, unless existing law is
changed by enactment of a constructive realization or carryover-of-
basis provision. If the farm is transferred by gift, incorporated or
exchanged in a tax-free transaction, the taxpayer's "excess deductions
account" will be inherited by the new owner. But it is a reasonable
prediction that this theoretical carryforward will often be forgotten in
practice, however ingenious it may be in theory. The transmutation of
capital gain into ordinary income, in short, will occur in only a
fraction of the cases in which excess farm losses are realized.
Even when section 1251 actually triggers a conversion of long-
term capital gain into ordinary income, it will often be only a slap on
the wrist. Assume, for example, that Farmer Brown had a farm net
loss of $125,000 in 1971, operates at a $25,000 loss every year from
1972 to 1980, and sells his farm at the end of 1980 at a profit of
$1,000,000. Only $100,000 of this long-term capital gain will be ad-
versely affected by section 1251. Let us assume that section 1251
increases the tax on this $100,000 of long-term profit from $35,000
(capital gain rate of 35%) to $70,000 (maximum ordinary income rate
of 70%). This means, in effect, that as of 1971, when Farmer Brown
incurred $100,000 of "excess deductions," he saved $70,000 of federal
income tax, and was told that 10 years later he may have to pay an
additional $35,000 of taxes as retribution. The net result is that his
$70,000 of tax savings in 1971 is reduced by the discounted value of
$35,000 to be paid 10 years later, viz., $13,500 if the discount rate is
10%. If the taxpayer in question sold his farm at a profit in less than
10 years from the date when he enjoyed the excess deductions, or if
the appropriate discount rate is less than 10%, section 1251's penalty
would of course be more costly; but by the same token, if the holding
period of the farm was longer than 10 years or the appropriate dis-
count rate is greater than 10%, the penalty would be even more lenient
than in my example.
Section 1251 is presumably addressed to two problems. One is the
fact that some taxpayers with substantial amounts of non-farm income
are able to persuade the Internal Revenue Service and the courts that
their farms are bona fide businesses (and thus to escape section 183),
when in fact they are hobbies. The other problem is that the Code
permits farmers to deduct a variety of expenditures that add to the
value of their farm properties and that, by ordinary accounting stan-
dards, should be capitalized rather than deducted. These are both
genuine problems, but section 1251 is only a token response to them.
Analyzed in isolation, section 1251 is innocuous; one might debate
whether it is better than nothing, or worse. One might ask, for
example, why losses on a citrus grove should escape section 1251 if the
1974]
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taxpayer's other income is derived from a wheat farm, but fall into
section 1251's grasp if his income comes from selling hardware or
practicing law; or why soil conservation expenditures incurred and
deducted in 1971 should be recaptured in 1980, if their usefulness was
exhausted in prior years, so that the gain on selling the farm does not
in any way reflect these expenditures; and so on.
But my complaint is not the scope of section 1251. It is, rather,
that section 1251 may elicit more token responses to genuine problems.
(Indeed, one might argue that this trend began with the recapture
provisions of section 1245 and section 1250.) If accepted as a model,
section 1251 might be followed by dozens of separate "excess deduction
accounts," each posing as a "reform" of one of the numerous other
statutory provisions for the current deduction of expenditures that, by
normal tax accounting standards, should be capitalized. These include
research and experimental expenditures, intangible drilling and de-
velopment expenses, circulation expenses of newspapers and
magazines, accelerated depreciation and many others-any of which
may be deducted from income generated by other activities."a
In my opinion, each of these provisions should be dealt with
head-on, not by establishing a mini-schedule that segregates its benefits
for recapture when, as and if some event occurs in the future. If the
provision serves a useful purpose, let it be accepted and defended
wholeheartedly; if it is too generous, cut it back directly by imposing
percentage, dollar or similar limits in the year when the deduction is
taken; if it has outworn its usefulness, repeal it. The kind of tokenism
that is typified by section 1251 needlessly complicates the Code, and its
remedy, when it actually applies, is utterly erratic.
C. Excessive Statutory Detail
I have suggested earlier that detailed statutory provisions can
simplify rather than complicate the law. Having acknowledged this,
however, I want to go on to argue that the Code has far too many
detailed provisions, but that this affliction, in a curious way, is a
tribute to the extraordinary analytic skills that have been developed in
the last few decades by both government and private tax experts. To
illustrate my point, let me refer to the variety of constructive owner-
ship rules in the Code, illustrated by the chart in Appendix C.
(Though only seven years old, the chart would already have to be
amplified to encompass all the refinements of today's Code.) Another
illustration is the network of private foundation rules, enacted in 1969,
which a leading tax practitioner has summarized in the chart in
Appendix D. He has identified 14 categories of charitable organiza-
tions, which are subject to 34 different legal requirements, so that a
10. Other precedents for the segregation of income and deductions from a particular type of
activity are sections 1211 and 1212 (capital losses) and section 163(d) (excess investment interest).
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portrait of the way the rules apply to each category of organizations
requires a chart with 476 cells.
While some of this statutory complexity is accidental, much of it
results from the tax expert's analytic skill in sniffing out the potential
abuses and potential inequities that can be generated by general rules,
coupled with a utopian passion for eradicating both flaws. These
talents are possessed in equal measure by lawyers in the Treasury, on
the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, in the
practicing bar and in the academic world. The experts are of course
not autonomous, and the substantive rules which they advocate reflect
the deeper interests-financial, political, social, and intellectual-that
they represent or reflect. But however divergent their motives and
objectives, their common passion is a rule for every conceivable set of
circumstances. Lest I be accused of treason to my profession, perhaps I
should add that tax economists have a passion for macroeconomic
concepts that can keep them from seeing the trees in the forest; if
lawyers are overly preoccupied with statutory detail, economists too
often discount its importance. Perhaps what we need is an exchange of
roles.
The expert who represents the interests of clients wants to hobble
every lever that might be used by a revenue agent or court to manipu-
late a proposed general rule, while the reformer cannot sleep easily
unless he has blocked up every chink in the government's armor.
These drives-which generate a common distrust of generalities-are
unfortunately not counterbalanced by an equally powerful concern
with the problems of interpreting and enforcing the resulting complex
statute. Legislative deadlines discourage attention to anything other
than a remedy for the potential abuse or inequity. It is easy to per-
suade oneself that the Treasury Regulations will clarify the intricacies,
and the private practitioner who is trying to get a concession is not
inclined to look a gift horse in the mouth. Thus, simplicity is like a
lighthouse: everyone can attest to its value, but no one will pay the
price voluntarily.
I find it easy to understand this important source of complexity,
because I have contributed my share, and I am not sanguine about
eliminating it, because I would not myself readily put my analytic and
critical skills on the shelf. To suggest to tax lawyers that they should
refrain from exercising their talents when the point of diminishing
returns is reached is like asking doctors to suppress their impulse to
keep patients alive by every available scientific device: we. have no
agreed or enforceable criteria to determine how far is too far. I regret
that the best I can offer by way of prescription is a more self-conscious
recognition of our passion for intricate detail and an acknowledgement
that elaborate formulations are useless if they cannot be effectively
enforced.
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D. Private Legislation Couched in General Terms
The Code contains a number of provisions that were intended to
provide relief for a particular taxpayer or institution, but that are
couched in general terms. Because the tax adviser must pore over
these provisions to see whether they may apply to his client, they add
to the complexity of the law. Their contribution to this plague may not
be substantial, but it is particularly galling because the provisions
often make no redeeming contribution to the fairness or efficiency of
the tax law. They are also irritating monuments to the importance of
persuading the right legislator at the right time of one's case for special
treatment-an opportunity that comes to few taxpayers among the
many whose claims are equally valid.
It is possible, of course, to overstate this objection, since by
drawing attention to a serious problem, a specific taxpayer's complaint
may stimulate enactment of a provision that, though narrowly drawn,
encompasses other taxpayers who are similarly situated. I disagree, for
example, with the conventional criticism of the unlimited charitable
deduction of section 170(b)(1)(C), and regret its repeal; though enacted
to aid a particular taxpayer, its effect was in my opinion salutary.
Moreover, when a specialized complaint seems to deserve a favorable
legislative response, something can be said for legislation of general
though narrowly confined applicability, rather than a private bill
naming the particular taxpayer. Since there may be others unknown to
the legislature who are similarly situated, there is an aura of unfairness
about private legislation. Even so, the Congress ought to consider the
imposition of chronological deadlines more frequently in legislation of
this character, so that the provision will be outlawed by time at an
early date, rather than carried forward interminably. It is easier to
extend the date of legislation that is scheduled for expiration, if a
longer life seems warranted, than to repeal a provision that has no
time limit, and hence may create expectations and action in reliance,
even when it has outlived its usefulness.
E. Stylistic Discipline
Although the involuted phraseology of the Code may be less of a
problem than humorists and even experts sometimes allege, it is cer-
tainly not a blessing. Moreover, one need not turn to the corporate,
fiduciary or private foundation provisions for language that needs
pruning, guideposts, better cross-references and other revisions. It is
not really necessary, for example, to employ the windy formula that
appears in section 214 and elsewhere: "In the case of an individual, . ..
there shall be allowed as a deduction . . . ." when one can say
directly: "An individual may deduct. . . ." Anyone who has asked a
class of law students to read and explain the sick pay and related
provisions (sections 104(a)(3), 105, and 106) can testify to the need for
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greater clarity in provisions that affect millions of taxpayers. In a
tribute to President Johnson, published in the New York Times on
January 26th 1974,11 Bill Moyers describes a session at a 1966 interna-
tional conference when a final memorandum was being prepared for
release to the press. The President looked at the draft, described by
Mr. Moyers as written in "flat, sterile, polysyllabic prose," and insisted
on rewriting the preamble. His objective, he said, was a revised
version that "can be read in the public square at Johnson City." I don't
propose a Code that can be read at town meetings, but if a provision
intended for mass consumption cannot be summarized in language
that will be understood by the citizens of Johnson City, it ought to be
re-examined with great suspicion. And if a provision of the Code
cannot be understood by a good law student with a grounding in
taxation, there should be an irrebutable presumption that it needs to
be re-written.
11. New York Times, Jan. 26, 1973, § L, at 35, col. 2.
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APPENDIX B*
A New Road for T&E Expenses
TI-nK FINAL travel and tntt'rtainn nt rtl. dtpit "'latriy- tile "Tax edaction Tirnpike"hidi wtit" h bneet preptarcd
ing' attempts by the ,ttnnissionter. are still apt to be ly RtlIbrt H. Mfottyek. CPA. of the Chicago office of Arthur
somewhat of a mae for the pratitioter. To aid thit in oNig & Cotpinty. In addti n ti giving aln overall view if
finding his way along tihe new route, we present a lap of irtat ruls it may find poutlarity ias a tax "Mionopoly."
If an expense ittake, its was ftotn tie
entranqce It the tatd it its ieenonatitt at
Route 1120. (or Rtie 1Il. as the ease
may ie). it is dedlibilc. Htwetec in mak-
itg the trip,. a few olds tl eplantattio are
I. Before Jannta.r I. 1913 all otitnaty
ait tecessa expenses pr -tetlol onto the
express lanes leading t' ROttte 1120(. Today.
all such ripe--tes nt take the indicated
tleltn. and only those orlinars atttd "e-
sacy eipetses that ace nttl rfiticl to take
one of the thre speili ctt-o, blnl thcr
way to the express ats.
2, Traveling expcoxes mtt take the lirst
cut -off, on which there are Iwo polctlial
dead ends which trap the perstal portion
of transportation expestss anti expenses
which are lavish atitd extravagant. The re-
maining traveling expenses eontinte on the
cutoff to the junction leading into the
weight station, where We shall rejoin these
expenses at item 6 ielow.
3. Expenses for enterlainoteltt. aMus
ment, anti recreation take the second cut.
oil. which leatl into the itll plaza. only
thtne ilems whitI ace pernitutitd thrttuglt
one if It eleei toll gaies utay continue.
"fh e passing through ote of the last live
gates go directly to the express lanes: the
balatce eotinlt In the 'eight station.
4. "lhe cost of facilities used for enter.
laintctl. amusement, and recreation mtust
take an additioxal detour. These not pri-
niarily for business run into a dead end.
anti even ilie pctaOln. piitt of thtse used
pritarily o husintes must leave the road.
IThe btalance of the costs continue to the,
toll plaza. where all must pass through one
of the gates. Note that gate two ioes not
permit facilities to enter. After the toll
plaza, the costs proceed either to the ex.
press lanes or to the weight station.
5. At the third cut-off, all gifts must
turn. Gills coiting $4 or less (containing
taxpayers name anti widely distributed).
gifts of promotional materials, and employ.
ce awards (tangible personal property cost-
ing $100 or less. for service or safety achieve-
ment) are permitted to turn onto the ex-
fites lat. whi fl ltad di l y to Rtitte
1120. rifts almie $25 pr year per doon
t into a 0ead cnt. andl tie balane ron-
litic oin the evight statio.
it At the weight station. 'he evidence in
,ippoi t of an itetm is ineastril. A diary en-
llt is heavy enough to sttisfy all the sale-
keepers. except that a receipt is neefel for
ietis ovecr $25 anid all expenses fir liogitlg.
I he fite scales frlire prioof of he bii.
iit- purpose, time of expetlitore, telation
to business of all persons present at the ex.
penditne. place and desriplion of ripen-
ditre, and amount of expenditure. Note
that mitleage allaowe's in employees (up
ito 15C) and tratel expese reimbulsements
tit employees unrelated to the employer (up
to $25 dails) mai tratel around the last
scale.
7. lhose expenise reaching the junclion
with Route 11201 are allowable as deduc.
8. While no speed limit is posted, the
fact that the road is new and difficul indi.
cates that we should travel it carefully.
* Copyright 1963. Reprinted by permission from Oelbaum, ed., Personal Tax Problems: A
New Road for T & E Expenses, 19 J. TAX. 96, 98 (Aug. 1963).
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OUTLINE OF MAJOR ATTRIBUTION RULES
A = Applicable
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b. Option to acquire option considered same as ownership of
stock . . ...... . .. .. . ........ . .. ... ..... . A N A A A
2. Attribution frot partnerships:
a. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partnership,
is attributed to any partner with 5% or more interest in capital
or profits, in proportion to his interest (greater of capital or
profits) . ........................................ ....... . A N A N A N A
b. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partnership,
is attributed proportionately to eaclh partner .............. NA A A A
3. Attribution frtom estates or trusts:
a. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for at estate or
trust, is attributed to any beneficiary with 5% or more actuarial
interest in such stock, to the extent of such actuarial interest, A NA NA NA
b. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a trust, is
attributed to the grantor or other substantial owner of the trust. A NA A NA
c. These attributions do not apply to stock owned by a quali-
fied employees' stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust. . A NA A NA
d. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for ais estate or
trust, is attributed proportionately to each beneficiary. NA A A A
4. Attribution fros corporations:
a. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or [or a corporation,
is attributed to any stockholder who owns, actually or con-
structively, 5% or more in value of the corporation's stock, in
proportion to tile value of his stock interest.. A NA NA NA
b. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corpora-
tion, is attributed proportionately to each stockholder ....... NA A NA A
c. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corporation,
is attributed to any stockholder who owns, directly or indirectly,
50% or more in value of the corporation's stock, in proportion
to the value of his stock interest ..... ......... NA NA A NA
5. Attribution fros spoute:
a. General rule-individual is considered to own stock in a
corporation owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his spouse. A A A A
b. Exception-general rule does not apply if ach of the fol.
lowing conditions is satisfied for taxable year of corporation: .
(i) Individual does sot at anytime during such taxable year
own directly any stock in such corpotration. (ii) Individual
is not a director or employee and does not participate in man-
agement of corporation at any time during such taxable year.
(iii) Not more than 50% of corporation's gross income for such
taxable year was derived from royalties, rents, dividends, in.
* Copyright 1967. Reprinted by permission from Ricketts, Accounting: An Outline of the
Four Major Attribution Rules; How They Operate, 26 J. TAX. 26, 28-30 (Jan. 1967)..
TAX REFORM AND TAX SIMPLIFICATION
OUTLINE contintsed
A - Applicable NA = Not Applicable




terest, and annuities. (is) Such stock in such corpoiratio is
not at any time in such taxaile year, subject to conditions in
favor of the individual or his minor children whiclh suhssantially
restrict or limit spouse's right to dispose of such stock. A NA NA NA
6. Attribution from children, grandchildren, parents and grand.
parents.
a. Children usler 21 seats if age:
I. Individual is coitislercd to own stock owned, directsy or
indirectly. by nr for his minor children. ...... A A A A
2. Individual under 21 years of age is considered to own stock
iowned, directly or indirectly, by or for his parents. A A A A
b. Aduhl dildren and grandchildren:
1. Individual who owns, actually or constructielv, more tian
'f, [ total voting power t all stock or more than 50% of total
value of all stock in a corporation is considered to own the stock
in sath corporation owned. directly or indirectly, by or Io his
parents, grandparents, grandchildren, and adult children. A NA NA NA
2. Indsiual is considered to own stock owned. diretlsy or
iilirectly, iy ir for his aiestort and his lineal descetlnits. NA A NA A
3. Indiiidual is sotsiderd to osn stitck owncdi, titl s r
indirectly, Iy or for his dsilen. gratsdchildren, aul parent
"Children" itlldes legally adopted children. NA NA A NA
4. For pirposes of Sectiii 341(di) only, an idisidual is con.
sidered to own stock owned, directy or indirectly, b or lot
the spuse., oif iat itlidual's, lineal descendants ......... NA NA NA A
7. Attribution trom brothers and sisters:
it. Indsdual is onsidered itw stotk wd, directiy or
indirectly. 1, or for his hisiers and sisters (whether hy the
whole or half-hlood). . ........................... ... NA A NA A
is. For purposes of Section 341(d) oily. an individual is roo-
sidered to own stock owned, directis or indirectly., iv or [ir
the spouses of his brothers and sister (whether by the whole or
half-bloodx) . .NA NA NA A
8. Attribution from partners:
a. Indisidual w -iwits, miuually (in constructielsy, any stock
in a corporation (ex ept or Issrirustive owneishiip through a
tttember of his family). is s itsidercd to own the stock owned,
directly or indlrectly, by or [i his partner. NA A NA A
9. Attribution to partnerships:
it. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a partner.
shall be considered as owned by the sarnership ............ NA NA A NA
10. Attribution to estates:
a. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or foe a henefiiary
if an estate shall be considered as owned Iy the estate. NA NA A NA
I. Attribution to trusts:
a. Stock owned, directly or indirectly, fy or for a beneficiary
if a trust (other than a qualified employees' stock ioous, pes
sion, or profit sharing trst) shall be considered as owned by the
trust, unless such henefitiare's interest in the trust is a remote
contingent interest. NA NA A NA
(Outline continued next page)
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OUTLINE continued SECTION SECTION SECTION SECTION
A = Applicable NA = Not Applicable 1.565e) 267(r) 318 544(a)
6, Stork voledx. iir-1'tly air i bylirclly, h  or for the granil al i
other uhsitaltiil owner if i ortion of  trost, imll Ibe -ii-
sidered as oned by tie trst NA NA A NA
12. Attributin to cnrporations:
a. If sl';, or ilnl hi Auali l o l Ihtouk in a .a or ali. n iais
owned, dire(ly r nidirily, by 'Sr for any r prao, sush corlpo.
ratioll shall he ioiider d as nlwning the siok onited, directly
or i dira'y, hy or far sul per.oo. NA NA A NA
I. Operating rule,:
(i) General rtLe-extep as provided in subpararapllh (B),
stock ....sir tticly aoni by a persol ntkr Seat ios 1563(e)
(I). (2). (3), (4) (5). or (6) shall, flir pirps ses a applying stub
ctioni., h tireaied as actually owned by such peran. A NA NA NA
(ii) loil r ol f;anily-tlik aoniruliodIy owed by an in.
ilividual under Secciis 156l3(e)(5) or (6) shall not be treated as
owned by him for purposes of again applying sul leattions in
orler to make aiiiother the consiructive owner of ilrh stock. A NA NA NA
(iii) Stalk .ll..iruclvltiiy ownsd l a erona uder Scctial
267(()(1) shall. lir lirfoses if applying Sttilli 267(r)(1). (2),
or (3), le treated as actually owned y iuh perso. NA A NA NA
(iv) Stnk aaraantiaciiely awned by an idialal auaier Sere.
tions 267(c)(2) ar (3) shall not be treated as owned by him for
the puirlne of again applying either of such salions in order
toa imake ,another tile onstrativ awner of itch stock ......... NA A NA NA
a) Excep a provided io Sectii 318(a)(5)(B) and (C), stock
constrcutitcly owned ly a [lerion under Sections 31(a)(1), (2),
(3), or (4). shall, for aurpoies of applying Sections 3l(a)(1), (2).
(3), and (4), Ibe considered ai actually owned ly such person. NA NA A NA
(vi) Stok ('onstrauaively owned by an n al under Serhi
318(a)(I) shall not le considered is owned by him far purposs
of again apply-ing Srtuon 518(a)(1) in order to make another
tae constructive owner. .. .................... ........ NA NA A NA
(vii) Stank construcaisely owned by a partnership, estate, trust,
or corporation shall not be considered as owned lay it in order
to make another person the constructive owner. .... . NA NA A NA
(viii) Stock conitructively owned ly a person under Sections
544(a)(I) or (3) shall, for purposes of applying Sectias 544(a)(1)
or (2), be considered as actually owned by such person .... NA NA NA A
(ix) Stock constructisely owned by an individual unde Sectit
544(a)(2) shall not be considered as owned by him for purposes
of again applying Section 544(a)(2) in order to make another
the constructive owner .. . ............................ .. NA NA NA A
(x) If stack may be considered as constructively owned by a
person because such person owns an option to acquire stock or
to acquire an option, and such stock may also be considered as
constructively owned by such person under another provision
of this section of the Code, then such stock shall be considered
as constructively owned by such person by reason of the option. A NA A A
(xi) Under Section 544(b). outstanding securities convertible
into stock shall be considered as outstanding stock for some pur-
poses under Sections 542(a) and 543(a) ......... ... NA NA NA A
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APPENDIX D*
BENEFITS AND BURDENS AFFECTING FOUNDATIONS
(REFERRED TO AS F)
Requirements as to establishment or maintenance of
exempt status and classification of Foundation
1. F is required to file an exemption application with IRS (if organized
after 10/9/69). §508(a).
2. F is required to amend basic documents to avoid penalty taxes
(§4942-45). §508(e).
3. F is required to file notice to IRS that it is not a private foundation.
§508(b).
4. F is subject to penalty tax on termination of private foundation. §507(a).
5. F is specifically authorized to receive assets of a terminating private
foundation, thereby enabling private foundation to avoid tax on termi-
nation of its status. §507(b).
Attributes affecting classification of Foundations
6. F's payments are treated as "public support" (not from disqualified
persons) to recipient organizations for purposes of §509(a)(2).
7. Control by F is permitted over organization qualifying as public foun-
dation under §509(a)(3).
8. F qualifies as an organization that can provide support (up to 25 per
cent) of a Private Operating Foundation. §4942(j)(3)(B)(iii).
Restrictions on activities and holdings of Foundations
9. F's managers [trustees, officers, etc. defined in §4946(b)] are subject to
penalty tax for failure to meet restrictions under §§4941-4945, 6684.
10. F is subject to tax on self-dealing. §4941.
11. F is subject to tax on failure to distribute. §4942.
12. F qualifies as organization to which distributions can freely be made
by a Private Foundation. §4942 (g)(1).
13. F qualifies as organization to which distributions can be made under
§49 42(g) only if an equivalent is distributed within the following
year. §4942(g) (3).
14. F is subject to tax on excess business holdings. §4943.
* Copyright 1970. Reprinted with the permission of The Practical Lawyer, 4025 Chestnut
Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19104. "A Tax Treatment Table for Charitable Organizations Under the
Tax Reform Act of 1969" by Norman A. Sugarman appeared in the March 1970 issue, Volume
16, No. 3, pp. 85-93.
19741
2. N N N N Y Y Y Y
3. Y," Y' Yb Y,7 * * * *
4. N N N N Y Y Y Y
5. Y N N N N N N
6. Y N N N N N N N
7. Y Y N N N N N N
8. Y Y Y Y Y,
9. N N N N Y
N N N N Y
N N N N N
Y Y Y Y Y
* * * * *
14. N N N N Y
d dY
d * d *
d N d"N "Y
N d N
d N d *
N *
N ~'N
yC Y " N d d d N Y
Y Y Y (IN d Y
d y d dY Y N Y Y
y d d ed dN YY N N Y
N N N ' ( dN N
Y Y Y dd "N Y
d (I d hY N Y Y
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
APPLICATION TO CATEGORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS*
A B C D E F G H I JK L







* The letters A-N represent the 14 categories of organizations. Numbers 1-14 represent 14 of
the 34 Benefits and Burdens. "Y" means "yes"; "N" means "no"; * means "not applicable"; lower
case letters denote specific provisions affecting particular types of foundations.
